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Chairman Perlmutter, Ranking Member Luetkemeyer, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify at today’s hearing. My name is Hilary Allen, and I
am an Associate Professor at the American University Washington College of Law. I teach
courses in corporate law and financial regulation, and my research focuses on financial stability
regulation. I have authored numerous law review articles and a book about financial stability,
which have (among other things) defined the concept, explored its precautionary and
interdisciplinary nature, and considered the financial regulatory architecture needed to promote
financial stability.
Prior to entering academia, I spent seven years working in the financial services groups
of prominent law firms in London, Sydney and New York. In 2010, I worked with the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, which was appointed by Congress to study the causes of the
financial crisis of 2007-2008.
I am not testifying on behalf of the Washington College of Law or any other institution;
the views expressed here are entirely my own.
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1. Executive Summary
Tackling climate-related threats to financial stability will require a coordinated and
interdisciplinary approach from our financial regulatory agencies. In this statement, I propose a
number of reforms to this end (these reforms are summarized on pages 18-20), but before diving
into their technical details, it’s important to recognize the stakes of the problem at hand. The
economic and social impacts of financial crises can be irreversible and catastrophic, particularly
for the most vulnerable members of society (who are also more likely to be suffering from the
more direct environmental consequences of climate change). Because emergency measures taken
once a financial crisis comes to a head will struggle to fully contain that crisis, financial regulators
should take steps in advance to make the financial system more robust to the climate-related
uncertainty that we face.
In this statement, I stress the importance of a precautionary approach to climate as a
systemic risk. Policymakers and regulators following a precautionary approach should be creative
in their thinking about threats to financial stability, and favor bold, simple responses that err on
the side of preventing the irreversible and catastrophic harms I just mentioned. While uncertainty
remains about many of the precise threats that climate change will generate for the financial
system, we are already aware of broad contours of these threats. Physical and transition risks can
create market, credit, liquidity, and operational risks for financial institutions, and these can
interact to create systemic risks that threaten the stability of the entire financial system.
I will draw particular attention to the operational risks posed by extreme weather events
and other environmental changes, as the potential systemic interactions of operational risks have
not received the attention they deserve. I propose a new form of “macro-operational regulation”
that can respond to the systemic dimensions of operational risks. I also consider risk-based capital
requirements, and how to use them appropriately given the uncertainty surrounding climate-related
threats to financial stability. For some acute transition risks, heightened risk-weightings are
already appropriate, but simpler buffers of equity funding are a better response to the general
uncertainty surrounding climate-related threats to financial stability. In terms of supervision more
generally, I argue for a robust precautionary principles-based approach to supervising financial
institutions, which will require banking regulators to repudiate recent efforts to hamstring their
own supervisory discretion.
This statement also stresses that a robust financial regulatory architecture is needed to
support these reforms. It focuses on the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “FSOC”) and
the Office of Financial Research (the “OFR”), highlighting that both of these regulatory bodies
need more staffing and would benefit from greater independence. I single out the OFR as a
regulatory body that could serve as a hub for the interdisciplinary expertise needed to confront
climate as a systemic risk (particularly climate science, environmental economics, data science,
computer science, and complexity science). With this interdisciplinary expertise, the OFR could
develop new technologically-informed approaches to data collection and analysis, improving our
understanding of building physical and transitional risks. The OFR could also innovate new
regulatory approaches, like a real-time reporting system for operational outages, and consistent
physical identifiers for financial assets and collateral.
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2. Financial stability as a regulatory goal
Today’s hearing is about climate-related systemic risks that could impact the stability of
our financial system. I want to start this statement by elaborating on what “financial stability”
means, so that our end goal is clear. We can’t say that our financial system is stable just because
we’re not currently experiencing a financial crisis; our financial system is only stable if it is robust
to future shocks. Of course, that does not mean that all risks should be eliminated from the
financial system. The focus of financial stability regulation should be on systemic risks that could
compromise the ability of financial institutions and markets to perform the risk management,
capital intermediation and payments processing functions necessary for broader economic growth.
Financial stability regulation should not lose sight of the fact that the endgame is sustainable
economic growth – protecting the financial institutions and markets that make up that system is a
means to that end.1
Promoting financial stability should be a mandated goal for all financial regulatory
agencies. A financial stability goal is already implicit in the mandates for many financial
regulatory agencies – for example, the Federal Reserve takes the view that its “financial stability
mandate is seen in the penumbra of the Federal Reserve Act, and that is legally sufficient”2 – but
most agencies lack an explicit statutory direction to promote financial stability (the exceptions that
do have clear statutory mandates focusing on systemic risks and financial stability are the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, the Office of Financial Research, and the Federal Insurance Office
which I will discuss shortly). Legislating financial stability mandates for each of the federal
financial regulatory agencies would make it abundantly clear that they are authorized to take the
precautionary steps needed to protect financial stability generally, and more specifically, to address
climate as a systemic risk. While my testimony today is focused on systemic risk and financial
stability, climate change will also impact other financial regulatory mandates relating to market
efficiency, investor protection, consumer protection, and competition.3
3. A precautionary approach to financial stability regulation
The financial system is only one part of the broader, highly-interconnected, adaptive and
complex system that is our economy. That system has social, ecological and technological
components, and the financial system cannot be completely insulated from the other components

1

For further discussion of financial stability as a regulatory goal, see Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial
Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1087, 1098 et seq. (2015).
2
Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Future of
Banking Regulation and Supervision in the EU Conference, Financial Stability: The Role of the Federal Reserve
System (Nov. 15, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/bax131120.html). For a discussion of the SEC’s implicit
financial stability mandate, see Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715, 728-9
(2018).
3
For an overview of the different goals of financial regulation, see JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION, 62-68 (1st ed. 2016). For a discussion of how the SEC’s climate-related reforms can serve other
regulatory goals of protecting investors, promoting competition and facilitating capital formation (which relates to
the market efficiency goal), see Comment letter from Jill E. Fisch et al. responding to the SEC’s request for public
input on climate disclosure (Jun. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8911728244385.pdf.
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– including ecological disruptions from climate change.4 The interactions of components within
complex adaptive systems are very difficult to predict,5 and so many of the threats that the financial
system faces from climate change are not, strictly speaking, risks (risks occur with a known
probability and therefore lend themselves well to measurement). Instead, the major concern is
uncertainty about how changes in our climate, and a transition to a carbon-neutral economy, will
impact the financial system.6 When faced with uncertainty, one possible response is to wait and
see what will happen. However, when uncertain outcomes are potentially irreversible and
catastrophic, “wait and see” is not good policy. In the face of these kinds of irreversible and
catastrophic outcomes, government should err on the side of preventing them. This is known as
the “precautionary principle”.7
Financial crises are both irreversible and catastrophic. The consequences of the 2008
financial crisis demonstrate that even once the financial system starts to recover from a financial
crisis, economic recovery is often elusive for many members of society – and many of the crisis’
social harms can never be undone. A decade after the 2008 crisis, measures of broader economic
growth like GDP remained persistently lower than their pre-crisis trend suggested they should be,
with one study estimating the impact of the crisis as a “lifetime present-value income loss of about
$70,000 for every American”.8 The GAO has estimated the total cost of the crisis to the American
people as $13 trillion.9 This cost was not evenly distributed, though: while almost everyone’s net
worth decreased as a result of the crisis, those with investments in the stock market saw them
rebound relatively quickly with the S&P 500 returning to its pre-crisis high by March of 2013.
However, only about 50% of American families own any stocks.10 For most middle class families,
their net worth in 2017 remained lower than it had been in 2007.11 These disparities were even
more pronounced for middle class African American and Hispanic families.12 The brunt of the
irreversible economic damage caused by the 2008 crisis was therefore borne by more vulnerable
members of society, and there’s no reason to believe that things will be any different with future
crises.
All of this economic damage was incurred despite herculean and imaginative crisis
response efforts from the Federal Reserve and other governmental bodies: emergency responses
4

For a discussion of SETS, see J.B. Ruhl, Governing Cascade Failures in Complex Social-EcologicalTechnological Systems: Framing Context, Strategies and Challenges, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L 407 (2020).
5
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES, 5 (1999).
6
“There is a fundamental distinction between the reward for taking a known risk and that for assuming a risk whose
value itself is not known”; “true uncertainty [is]…. “not susceptible to measurement.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 21 (1921).
7
For a discussion of different formulations of the precautionary principle, see Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for
Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173, 195 et seq. (2013).
8
Regis Barnichon et al., The Financial Crisis at 10: Will We Ever Recover?, (Fed. Res. Bank S.F. Econ. Letters
Working Paper, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/economic- research/publications/economicletter/2018/august/financial-crisis-at-10-years-will-we-ever-recover/.
9
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT (2013).
10
Lowell Ricketts, When the Stock Market Rises, Who Benefits?, FED. RES. BANK ST LOUIS ON THE ECON. BLOG
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/february/when-stock-market-rises-who-benefits.
11
Nelson D. Schwartz, The Recovery Threw the Middle Class Dream Under a Benz, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-class-financial-crisis.html.
12
Id.
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can’t always contain the economic impact of financial crises once they occur. And it’s also
important to note that this is not a purely economic issue. Referring to the heightened
unemployment rates following the 2008 crisis, Janet Yellen observed that “[t]hese are not just
statistics. . . . The toll is simply terrible on the mental and physical health of workers, on their
marriages, on their children.”13 Growing unemployment can also result in increases in crime and
substance abuse.14 The stress associated with the experience of financial crises can also impact
the health of those impacted economically – medical studies conducted following the 2008
financial crisis demonstrated increased rates in heart attacks and suicides, and people were less
likely to seek preventative medical care in general because of concerns associated with the costs.15
Even among people who were able to keep their jobs and some sense of financial security during
the recession that followed the 2008 crisis, many experienced a pervading sense of uncertainty and
precariousness that may have caused delays in life events like marriage, home purchases and
retirement.
We shouldn’t assume that the 2008 crisis was a “once-in-a-generation” event. Many
people believe that we narrowly missed another financial crisis in March/April 2020,16 and unless
action is taken, financial crises may become much more frequent events as technology allows for
more and quicker transactions,17 and as climate-related events supply more shocks to the financial
system. The most vulnerable members of society are most likely to bear the brunt of the economic
fallout from financial crises, and with more frequent crises, they will have less time to recover
from them. At the same time, the most vulnerable members of society are also likely to be
suffering most from the more direct environmental consequences of climate change.18
Given the stakes involved, the avoidance (or at least mitigation) of financial crises is a
matter of paramount social concern. Regulatory intervention would be justified even if there were
only small chance of climate-related issues causing catastrophic financial crises, but as I will
discuss shortly, we can already anticipate some very significant problems that climate-related
13

Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chairwoman, Board Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks at “A Trans-Atlantic Agenda
for Shared Prosperity”: A Conference Sponsored by the AFL- CIO, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the IMK
Macroeconomic Policy Institute, A Painfully Slow Recovery for America’s Workers: Causes, Implications, and the
Federal Reserve’s Response 10 (Feb. 11, 2013).
14
Ronald A. Wilson, The View from South Tucson: How the Economic Crisis Affects Defendants in My Courtroom,
48 JUDGES’ J. 14 (2009).
15
Mona Fiuzat et al., United States stock market performance and acute myocardial infarction rates in 2008–2009
(from the Duke Databank for Cardiovascular Disease), 106 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1545 (2010); Aaron Reeves et al.,
Increase in state suicide rates in the USA during economic recession, 380 LANCET 1813 (2012); Annamaria Lusardi
et al., The Economic Crisis and Medical Care Use: Comparative Evidence from Five High-Income Countries, 96
SOC. SCI. Q. 202 (2015).
16
For discussion of the near miss at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, see Paul Tucker, Time to look again at the
financial system’s dangerous faultlines, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/0d848d03-7d664a76-a4f2-8f09980747fa.
17
“Faster trades means more trading”. Saule T. Omarova, Technology v Technocracy: Fintech as a Regulatory
Challenge, 6. J. FIN. REG. 75, 89 (2020).
18
“Communities of color and low-income or low-wealth, indigenous, rural, and rustbelt communities
are more likely to be impacted by floods, storms, drought, food and water insecurity, increased diseases, faltering
infrastructure, increased violence, and most other climate harms. These same communities often have the fewest
economic resources with which to respond”. PUBLIC CITIZEN & AMERICANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM, CLIMATE
ROADMAP FOR U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION, iv (2021),
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/Climate-Financial-Reg-Report.pdf.
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issues are likely to cause for the financial system.19 A precautionary approach counsels us not to
wait until we understand the precise risks involved before taking action – by then, it might be too
late to do anything about them.
While policy in the United States is very precautionary in some areas (for example,
counter-terrorism policy), the United States’ approach to financial regulation has not typically been
precautionary.20 Instead, the preference has often been to wait for a crisis to develop and then
provide emergency support and legislate a response after the fact. As I have just explored, that is
not a responsible or sustainable approach when it comes to financial stability in general, and
climate-related financial stability issues in particular.
4. Climate-related threats to financial stability
Although we do not yet have a precise understanding of many of the climate-related risks
that financial stability faces, we already know a lot about the general types of threats that could
disrupt the financial system. These threats have generally been divided into “physical risks” and
“transition risks” (although many of them are not really risks in the strictest sense, because we
don’t know their probability of occurring). When one or more of these threats become reality,
then they can generate market, credit, liquidity, and operational risks for financial institutions and
other participants in the financial markets. The interactions of these risks could potentially create
problems for the stability of the entire financial system.
The Financial Stability Board, an influential international body that monitors threats to
financial stability, has defined physical risk as “the possibility that the economic costs and financial
losses from the increasing severity and frequency of extreme climate-change related weather
events might erode the value of financial assets, and/or increase liabilities.”21 Physical risks are
most obviously of concern to the insurance industry, but they could also affect property that serves
as collateral for loans, if such property is threatened by rising seas, fires, hurricanes, or any other
manner of extreme weather or lasting environmental change.22 If collateral proves to be
vulnerable, the financial institutions that extended the secured loans could find themselves exposed
to significant losses in the event of borrower default – and borrower default could also be made
more likely by climate-related uncertainties (including an inability to renew insurance policies on
the collateral property as insurers exit challenging insurance markets).23
The Financial Stability Board characterizes transition risks as those relating “to the process
of adjustment towards a low-carbon economy, including shifts in policies designed to mitigate and

19

“[I]t is worth considering that the probability of financial risks from climate change materializing is high, if not a
certainty. Graham S. Steele, Confronting the ‘Climate Lehman Moment’: The Case for Macroprudential Climate
Regulation, 30 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 120 (2020).
20
For a discussion of variations in US precautionary attitudes, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?
A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP & INT’L L. 207, 210
(2003).
21
FIN. STAB. BD., STOCKTAKE OF FINANCIAL AUTHORITIES’ EXPERIENCE IN INCLUDING PHYSICAL AND TRANSITION
CLIMATE RISKS AS PART OF THEIR FINANCIAL STABILITY MONITORING, 2 (2020).
22
Id. at 7.
23
Steele, supra Note 19, at 119.
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adapt to climate change, which would affect the value of financial assets and liabilities.”24
Investments in and loans to fossil fuel-related businesses are obvious candidates for assets that
would be vulnerable to policy shifts regarding carbon-producing activities, as are commodity
swaps.25 However, we may ultimately be surprised by seemingly unrelated assets suffering from
transition risks – the spillover effects of a global phenomenon like climate change response are
likely to produce unexpected correlations amongst asset classes. Transition risks could arise from
domestic policy shifts with regard to certain kinds of assets, or policy changes made abroad, and
these changes will not necessarily be gradual: swift political action could come hard on the heels
of the occurrence of a major natural disaster. Assets could also be compromised following the
invention of a new and superior green technology that quickly renders existing industries obsolete,
or by retail investors’ increasing focus on environmental issues and rejection of carbon-intensive
industries.26 To be clear, these transition risks are not a reason to avoid adjustments towards a
low-carbon economy – these kinds of adjustments will be necessary to avoid what are likely to be
much larger economic dislocations from physical risks, and so it is the job of financial stability
regulation to try to mitigate the impact of these adjustments on our financial system.
If a large bank were exposed to enough market risk (in other words, if its investments were
to lose enough value) because of a physical or transition risk, it could fail and then its contractual
counterparties would be exposed to credit risks as it defaulted. If those credit risks were big
enough, some of the bank’s contractual counterparties could fail themselves, potentially dragging
down some of their counterparties, like dominos.27 Because contractual relationships between
financial institutions can serve as transmission belts that spread problems throughout the financial
system, financial stability regulation typically focuses on the largest financial institutions with
more relationships that are likely to generate more credit risk for the system overall if they fail.28
However, the simultaneous failure of many smaller financial institutions could also create systemic
risk.29
Financial institutions (large and small) are unlikely to simply accept the inevitability of
failure, though. In an attempt to save themselves, financial institutions that had invested in assets
suffering from a physical or transitional risk would seek to sell them off en masse, which would
put further downward pressure on the price of such assets (creating more market risk), potentially
24

FIN. STAB. BD., supra Note 21 at 2. “Carbon emissions have to decline by 45% from 2010 levels over the next
decade in order to reach net zero by 2050. This requires a massive reallocation of capital. If some companies and
industries fail to adjust to this new world, they will fail to exist.” Bank of England, Open Letter on Climate-Related
Financial Risks (Apr. 17, 2019) (available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2019/april/open-letter-onclimate-related-financial-risks).
25
Steele, supra Note 19, at 126.
26
On the subject of changing investor preferences, see Michal Barzuza et al, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG
Activism and the New Millenial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2020).
27
Regarding the transmission of risks by institutions, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, GEO. L. J. 193, 201
(2008).
28
Regulatory capital requirements, for example, are higher for the largest banks because of the heightened risk they
pose to financial stability. See Financial Stability Board, 2020 List of Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P111120.pdf.
29
“[T]he weakest link in the financial stability chain might be small, rather than large, financial intermediaries.”
Eric S. Rosengren, President & CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Defining Financial Stability, and Some
Policy Implications of Applying the Definition, Keynote Remarks at the Stanford Finance Forum, Graduate School
of Business, Stanford University, 9 (Jun. 3, 2011).
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requiring still more institutions to divest their holdings in a vicious cycle sometimes referred to as
a “fire sale externality”.30 If assets compromised by physical or transition risks were to become
difficult to sell because of uncertainty about their value, holders of those assets would also
experience liquidity risk, and they could then be forced to sell off other types of assets at a discount
in order to satisfy their obligations when they come due, potentially jeopardizing their own
solvency and transmitting the panic to other asset markets, instigating more fire sales.
Liquidity pressures could also arise because of reputational concerns, and then transform
into solvency pressures. For example, if a government were to adopt a policy that penalizes the
fossil fuel industry, the customers of a bank that is perceived as being close to the fossil fuel
industry might assume that the bank is in trouble, even if the bank’s portfolio is well-diversified.
If the bank’s customers rush en masse to withdraw their deposits on the basis of that mistaken
assumption, then the bank will be forced to start liquidating its assets in order to meet those
withdrawal requests, and if the time pressures involved mean that the bank has to sell those assets
at a discount, then it may very well become insolvent. Of course, there could also be liquidity
issues if the bank does indeed have significant exposures to fossil fuel related assets. For example,
if a bank has made many long-term loans to the oil and gas industry and funded those loans by
rolling over short-term funding (like overnight sale and repurchase agreements), that funding could
easily dry up as result of concerns about the bank’s exposure to the fossil fuel industry. This would
force the bank to sell these or other assets at a discount in order to raise the cash necessary to
satisfy its obligations when they come due: once again, we’re faced with the prospect of bank
insolvencies and fire sales (particularly if many banks have exposure to the same kinds of fossil
fuel related assets, and are selling at the same time).
These dynamics of domino institutional failures and fire sales dragging down markets are
systemic risks that can compromise the entire financial system. As financial institutions and
markets become compromised in these ways, their ability to provide the capital intermediation
services on which the broader economy depends – most notably, the provision of credit – is also
compromised.31 The financial system also provides important “plumbing” services, such as the
processing of payments, that are essential to economic growth. The physical infrastructure
involved in providing these types of services is vulnerable to physical risks,32 and this is another
potential (but often overlooked) source of systemic risk. Operational problems are usually
considered to be idiosyncratic problems for the institution experiencing them, with few spillover
effects. However, failure of one kind of financial infrastructure may sometimes result in its users
migrating to an alternative infrastructure, which could buckle under the increased load, forcing
more users to overload any remaining alternatives in yet another vicious cycle.33 There are a
variety of stress tests and other approaches that could be pursued to get a sense of when and how

30

For a discussion of fire sale dynamics, see Anil K. Kashyap et al., The Macroprudential Toolkit, 59 IMF ECON.
REV. 145 (2011).
31
Ben Bernanke, The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 3 (Sept. 13, 2018).
32
Christina Parajon Skinner, Central Banks and Climate Change, 75 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3703142.
33
For a discussion of cascading operational failures in the payments system, see Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure,
62 B.C. L. REV. 453, 469 et seq. (2021).
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usage might shift to alternative infrastructure following the manifestation of a physical risk;34
examining the business continuity plans of financial institutions involved in payments processing
and other “plumbing” functions would be a critically important part of any such exercise.
5. Regulatory responses
Disclosure
I want to start my discussion of possible regulatory responses to these threats by making it
clear that climate-related systemic risks are not something that the markets can be expected to
manage on their own. First, financial stability is a classic “public good”, in the sense that everyone
benefits from it, but the public can’t be forced to pay for it.35 Therefore, in the absence of
regulation, market participants have limited incentives to promote the stability of the financial
system – even if those market participants knew enough about the risks at hand to quantify and
price them (which they often do not), they would not automatically be “priced in” to assets.
Second, financial crises are a systemic problem, and avoiding them typically requires coordinated
action by many market participants. Market participants couldn’t compel other market participants
to coordinate their actions for the greater good, even if they wanted to. Because market participants
can’t manage systemic risks on their own, regulations mandating climate-related disclosures to
those market participants are necessary, but not a complete solution to climate-related systemic
risks.36
Regulatory Capital Requirements
Regulatory capital requirements should also be part of the response to these systemic risks.
Regulatory capital requirements are complicated, but their main goal is to create a cushion of
funding that allows banks to better absorb losses on their investments.37 If the cushion is too small
and the bank experiences losses on its investments, there is a greater chance that the bank’s
repayment obligations will end up exceeding the value of its investments. If the losses are big
enough and the cushion small enough, the bank may even become insolvent. Because banks have
strong incentives (particularly under the tax code) to fund their investments with more borrowed
money, minimum regulatory capital requirements have been implemented to protect bank solvency
34

“Netflix uses something called “chaos monkey” to shut down parts of its system randomly in order to learn more
about the connections therein, as well as the ability of those connections to transmit cascade failures. Although the
consequences of payments failure are much greater than an unavailable movie, some variation on this theme—
perhaps a simulation of shutting down parts of the system—could assist in understanding the pathways through a
constantly evolving ecosystem. Breakthroughs are also being made in the field of novelty detection, where artificial
intelligence is being utilized to “find unexpected outcomes in a system.” Recently, this type of technology has been
used to detect changes in retail payments flows that could serve as early warning signals of credit-related problems
with payments providers. Presumably, it also could be used to identify unusual payments flows that signal
operational problems.” Id. at 506-7.
35
For an introduction to the concept of public goods, and regulation as a response to the public goods problem, see
Matthew D. Adler, Regulatory Theory in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 598-9 (2d ed. 2010).
36
For further elaboration on this point, see Madison Condon, Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble, UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782675.
37
For further explanation of regulatory capital requirements, see Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo,
16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 125, 129 et seq. (2012).
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by requiring banks to fund their investments with a cushion of funding that doesn’t need to be
repaid to anyone. These minimum regulatory capital requirements (i.e. the size of the required
cushion) are typically expressed as percentages, and the percentages required are reasonably
consistent throughout the world because they are based on international standards promulgated by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
The numerator of any percentage calculation is the cushion of funding – the “capital” itself.
Capital can take many forms, ranging from the simplest and most loss-absorbent “Common Equity
Tier 1” (which includes common equity and retained earnings) to more complicated debt-equity
hybrid forms of funding. The denominator of the percentage calculation will depend on whether
you’re calculating a risk-based capital ratio (in which case, a complex process of risk-weighting is
applied to the bank’s assets to come up with the denominator) or a leverage ratio (the denominator
here is simpler – it is the total assets of the bank). When designing capital requirements, regulators
can therefore choose between more simple and more complicated approaches.
The risk-weighting approach is more complicated, but it can be useful for making banks
more robust to quantifiable risks; risk-weightings can also be used to discourage banks from
making certain types of investments that are considered risky. This approach could be used to
address known transition risks, such as those affecting investments in fossil fuel-related
businesses.38 When dealing with most climate-related threats, though, regulators should backstop
any complicated approach to risk-weighting with simpler approaches that are more robust to
uncertain events.39 We can think of these backstops as making the financial system more robust to
climate-related threats generally, rather than trying to anticipate a particular type of shock to the
system. A buffer of extra equity computed as part of a leverage ratio would be one way to respond
to that uncertainty (this is not contemplated in Basel Committee’s existing capital regime, and this
kind of change would benefit from international agreement). At the very least, adding a buffer of
extra equity to the risk-based capital requirements would provide a cushion to absorb
miscalculations of risk-weightings.40 This latter approach could be started immediately, relying
on the Basel Committee’s existing capital regime. Regulators already have the authority to
implement a countercyclical buffer that requires banks to fund up to an additional 2.5% of their
risk-weighted assets with Common Equity Tier 1 capital. As an alternative or a supplement to the
countercyclical buffer, regulators already have the authority to require the largest banks to fund
their investments with higher percentages of Common Equity Tier 1 capital – the current
percentages could be increased to provide more cushion to absorb climate-related uncertainties.
Stress Tests
When we have a good understanding of particular physical and transition risks, that
understanding can inform the development of hypothetical climate scenarios that can be used to
38
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stress test whether a financial institution has sufficient capital to withstand that kind of shock to
the system.41 Right now, these types of stress tests would be best suited to assessing known
transition risks, such as those affecting investments in fossil fuel-related businesses (as discussed
in the context of risk-weightings above). Stress tests can also be used to help better understand
how resilient financial institutions are likely to be in the face of climate change more generally.
Instead of being engineered to test for a particular outcome, these kind of stress tests would be
designed simply to find out “what would happen if . . . ”, and are particularly well-suited to
uncertain environments.42 Regulators should therefore consider running hypothetical scenarios of
possible physical risks, transition risk, and combinations of the two, to get a sense of what the
outcomes for individual financial institutions, and the financial system as a whole, are likely to be
in the long-term. These kinds of stress tests can start immediately, and regulators can learn from
their output. While it will sometimes be appropriate to adjust regulation in light of this output,
given the uncertainty involved in addressing climate as a systemic risk, financial regulators need
to be somewhat humble about the predictive value of these kinds of open-ended stress tests.
Supervision
Regulators will also need to be nimble. Because of the evolving nature of climate-related
threats, the hard work of making the financial system more robust will often need to be done
through tweaks made as part of the ongoing supervision of financial institutions (for example,
limitations may need to be placed on financial institutions’ portfolios of carbon-related assets, or
divestiture orders may become appropriate).43 In the face of this evolving and uncertain situation,
a use of principles-based regulation may be necessary. In a principles-based regulatory regime,
high level objectives are adopted through formal rule-making procedures, and then informal
guidance supplies much of the detail on how to satisfy these objectives – in a fluid situation, this
affords greater flexibility to both the regulators and the regulated entities in determining how to
comply with the high-level objectives.44 To be clear, regulators should not adopt the light-touch
principles-based regulation we have sometimes seen in the past, which can devolve into too much
deference to the financial industry and therefore work as a type of deregulation.45 In particular,
regulators should not be too deferential to banks’ hedging strategies and internal risk models,
because those strategies and risk models will not be able to respond to true uncertainty and may
very well leave banks’ vulnerable to unanticipated threats. Instead, we need precautionary
principles-based regulation that is committed to the high-level objective of protecting financial
41

Gregg Gelzinis & Graham Steele, Climate Change Threatens the Stability of the Financial System (Nov. 21,
2019) (available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2019/11/20072438/Climate-Change-FinancialStability-brief.pdf?_ga=2.190241067.187054642.1601052962-604474383.1601052962); Bank of England, The
2021 Biennial Exploratory Scenario on the Financial Risks from Climate Change (Dec. 18, 2019) (available at
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2019/the-2021- biennial-exploratory-scenario-on-thefinancial-risks-from-climate- change.pdf?la=en&hash=73D06B913C73472D0DF21F18DB71C2F454148C80).
42

For further discussion of the benefits of open-ended stress tests, see Robert F. Weber, A Theory for DeliberationOriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236 (2014).
43
Steele, supra Note 19, at 150.
44
For a discussion of a principles-based approaches to financial regulation, see Julia Black et al., Making a Success
of Principles-Based Regulation, 1 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 191 (2007).
45
As an example, see the critique of the UK FSA’s principles-based approach as being somewhat light-touch and
deregulatory in FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 86 et seq. (Mar. 2009),
http://www.actuaries.org/CTTEES_TFRISKCRISIS/Documents/turner_review.pdf.

11

stability from climate-related risks, but flexible in its application. The Interagency Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance adopted by banking regulatory agencies in 2018 will
complicate flexible approaches to regulation, though.46 This Interagency Statement (often referred
to as the “guidance on guidance”) made clear the agencies’ position that they would no longer
enforce their informal guidance against regulated banks.47 The Federal Reserve adopted a rule in
March of 2021 that effectively codified this guidance on guidance, but it and the other financial
regulatory agencies should move in the other direction and disaffirm this approach. Climaterelated supervision requires the flexibility that can come from informal guidance.
Climate-related supervision can also be improved if bank regulators start requiring banks
to disclose any known climate-related exposures in the call reports they submit to regulators. This
practice should begin immediately, and would benefit from input from the experience of banking
agencies around the world that have already integrated climate-related threats into their
supervisory process. An international network of central banks and financial regulators known as
the Network for Greening the Financial System (“NGFS”) is focused on “integrat[ing] the
monitoring of climate-related financial risks into day-to-day supervisory work, financial stability
monitoring and board risk management”:48 banking regulatory agencies should join the NGFS
immediately to enable them to take advantage of its collective expertise in this area (the Federal
Reserve has already joined the NGFS).49
Operational Risk Regulation
Finally, the threats posed by climate change require us to revise our current approach to
regulating operational risk. The Basel Committee had developed Principles for the Sound
Management of Operational Risk that require banks to monitor, identify and mitigate operational
risks, but these Principles mostly treat operational risk as something that a bank should manage on
its own, as a matter of internal governance and risk management. Principle 4, for example,
provides that “[t]he board of directors should approve and periodically review a risk appetite and
tolerance statement for operational risk that articulates the nature, types, and levels of operational
risk that the bank is willing to assume” [emphasis added].50 But what about the risks that a
financial institution might create for others? If the costs of operational failure fall on others,
institutions may be encouraged to underinvest in the robustness of their own infrastructure.
Even if a bank were willing to invest heavily to limit the consequences of any operational
problems, that bank might not have the capacity to assess and address the systemic consequences
46
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of the operational risks it is taking. It probably wouldn’t know how its competitors would be
affected by its operations, and even if it did, no bank can compel its competitors to resolve
collective problems. Financial regulators, on the other hand, have broader oversight and access to
confidential information (particularly business continuity plans) through their supervisory
functions. These regulators should take a more systemic approach to the management of
operational risks – I have described this approach as “macro-operational regulation” (reflecting its
parallels with macroprudential regulation, which seeks to avoid the systemic consequences of
actions taken by individual institutions to address their own credit and liquidity risks).51
We already have some regulatory tools that could be considered macro-operational. For
example, financial infrastructure can be designated as a “systemically important financial market
utility” by the Financial Stability Oversight Council,52 and then it will need to comply with the
Federal Reserve’s Regulation HH (which includes some relatively prescriptive requirements
relating to the management of operational risks).53 More macro-operational regulation is needed,
though. As physical threats to financial institutions’ operating systems become more pressing, a
real-time reporting system for operational issues will become crucial. Regulators should also
consider developing types of circuit breakers that can be deployed when operational issues occur,
preventing the execution of any business continuity plan that could overload shared financial
infrastructure. These regulatory measures should be backed by a whole-of-government approach
to improving the critical infrastructure (particularly telecommunications infrastructure) on which
the financial industry relies to provide its services – a lot can be learned from cyberpreparedness
exercises, for example. Finally, because none of these strategies are foolproof, it would be wise
to adopt policies that prevent a transition to a completely cashless society (for example, the
definition of “legal tender” could be amended to require businesses to accept cash as payment for
goods and services).54 The Federal Reserve has responded to past natural disasters by distributing
physical cash to affected communities;55 if we transition to a cashless society, that will no longer
be an option, raising the stakes of operational problems.
6. FSOC coordination
These are just some of the kinds of financial stability regulations that could make our
financial system more robust to climate-related threats. However, financial stability regulation is
often very challenging to implement in the United States. We have a very fragmented financial
51
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regulatory architecture with many different regulatory agencies, and the communication problems
and regulatory gaps that arise from this fragmentation pose challenges for all financial stability
regulation – not just regulation responding to climate as a systemic risk.56 This fragmentation may
be part of the reason why the United States has fallen behind the United Kingdom and the European
Union in developing regulatory approaches that respond to climate-related threats: to regain this
ground and confront the realities of climate change, all of the federal financial regulatory agencies
will need to coordinate on developing precautionary responses to climate threats.
The most readily available solution to these coordination problems is to involve the FSOC,
which was created in 2010 “to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States
financial system”.57 This FSOC is a council of the officials who lead the federal financial
regulatory agencies. Each of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Chairperson of the FDIC, the Director of the CFPB, the Chairman of the SEC, the
Chairman of the CFTC, the Director of the FHFA and the Chairman of the NCUA is a voting
member of the FSOC, as is “an independent member appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, having insurance expertise.” The FSOC also has five non-voting
members: the Director of the Office of Financial Research, the Director of the Federal Insurance
Office, and representative state banking, insurance and securities commissioners. Finally, the
Treasury Secretary is a voting member, and also acts as the Chair of the FSOC.58 The FSOC
should start responding to climate as a systemic risk by coordinating a road map of all the climaterelated regulatory approaches that are being pursued by each of these agencies, together with a
timing and implementation plan for each approach.
Since the FSOC was created, many reform proposals have sought to make increased use of
the FSOC (including the Addressing Climate Financial Risk Act of 2021, which proposes to create
a Climate Risk Advisory Committee within the FSOC). However, the FSOC has limited
legislative authority, and was set up with very limited resources (the FSOC was designed to
leverage the resources of the agencies headed by its members).59 The FSOC needs to be
strengthened before it can really be effective in responding to climate-related threats to financial
stability. Because of the Treasury Secretary’s agenda-setting position as chair of the FSOC, the
efficacy of the FSOC is dependent on how committed the Treasury Secretary is.60 Ideally, the
legislation that created the FSOC would be amended to give the FSOC a politically independent
chair, but if that kind of legislative reform is not possible, the FSOC should at least have a more
substantial staff. No legislative change would be needed before hiring more personnel for the
FSOC, and these resources are needed to support any Climate Risk Advisory Committee formed
within the FSOC.
The FSOC is also critical to extending financial stability regulation beyond banks to other
important financial institutions and markets.61 Dodd-Frank responded to the systemic risks posed
56
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by non-bank financial institutions by giving the FSOC power to designate those institutions as
systemically important and subject them to heightened regulation by the Federal Reserve.62 In
2019, however, the FSOC adopted guidance that largely neutered its own designation power63 –
that guidance should be replaced and the designation power revived. The FSOC should also
consider whether additional financial market utilities need to designated as systemically important
pursuant to Section 804 of Dodd-Frank. In addition, legislative amendments should be made to
Section 120 of Dodd-Frank, to authorize the FSOC to promulgate regulations that govern
systemically risky activities, not just make recommendations (this and other reforms were included
in the Systemic Risk Mitigation Act proposed in 2020).64
A “whole system” approach to climate change and systemic risk would also be boosted by
implementing my recommendation to give all of the FSOC’s member agencies financial stability
mandates – a climate committee on the FSOC would then be able to leverage the work of individual
agencies in order to promote stability. In the absence of this kind of mandate, some member
agencies may simply not consider climate-related systemic risks to be part of their job description.
The Addressing Climate Financial Risk Act of 2021 proposes that “Each member agency should
develop and make available a strategy to identify and mitigate climate financial risks within the
jurisdiction of the member agency.” (emphasis added), but if an agency does not consider financial
stability issues to be “within their jurisdiction”, then there will be gaps in the regulation of climaterelated systemic risks. To further encourage member agencies to diligently monitor and respond
to these risks, the signed statement and testimony requirements in Sections 112(b) and
112(a)(2)(N) of Dodd-Frank could be revised to require each member agency to certify and testify
that their individual agency is taking steps to promote financial stability by identifying and
responding to emerging climate-related threats.
It would also help to legislate a precautionary definition of “financial stability”, so that the
scope of the financial stability mandate is delineated (for the FSOC itself, as well as the individual
agencies). Right now, there is no definition of “financial stability” in Dodd-Frank. Something
like the following would be helpful:
The term “financial stability” shall mean a state of affairs wherein (i) financial institutions and markets are
able to facilitate capital intermediation, risk management, and payments in a way that enables sustainable
and inclusive economic growth; and (ii) financial institutions and markets are able to withstand economic
and other shocks so that there will be no significant disruption to the performance of the functions set forth
in (i).
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The final challenge that needs to be addressed with regard to the FSOC relates to insurance.
Even if all of the other federal financial regulatory agencies have a mandate to coordinate on
financial stability issues, insurance will continue to pose a problem because it is primarily
regulated at the state level. Financial stability mandates aren’t a very good fit for state-level
regulators (because financial stability is a borderless public good that will accrue largely to persons
residing outside of their state),65 but leaving insurance out of the discussion about climate as a
systemic risk is foolhardy. The Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) should therefore be made a
voting member of FSOC, and given more authority “to shape insurance regulation when it has
credibly determined that doing so is necessary to help monitor, manage, or prevent systemic risk
in insurance.”66
7. Interdisciplinary expertise and the Office of Financial Research
The types of precautionary regulation that I have called for in this statement ask a lot of
regulators. Regulatory agencies will need to be nimble, humble about what they don’t know,
understand environmental as well as financial issues, and staunchly promote the public interest in
the face of financial industry pressure. None of this will be possible without the necessary
expertise. In addition to the economic, legal, and financial expertise that is already well
represented in financial regulatory agencies, there will be an increasing need for climate scientists,
environmental economists, data scientists, computer scientists, and complexity scientists.
The benefits of these types of new expertise will be maximized if the expertise is
concentrated in a hub, rather than scattered through the different regulatory agencies. Establishing
a hub will serve a coordinating function for climate-risk policy, preventing fractured policy from
emerging from the different regulatory agencies. A hub will also respond to anticipated hiring
difficulties in several ways (with new types of climate-based regulations coming into play, banks
and other financial institutions will also be seeking to hire personnel with climate-related expertise,
offering salaries that make it harder for the government to attract these personnel). First,
consolidating interdisciplinary personnel in a hub prevents agencies from poaching from one
another those experts who are willing to work for the government. Second, the prospect of
working with like-minded experts (rather than being one of a few at an agency where their
expertise isn’t understood or seen as core to the agency’s mission) would be attractive to
prospective hires. The synergies that could emerge from having a large innovative and
interdisciplinary workforce considering creative responses to climate-related systemic risks (and
other emerging systemic risks, like those arising from fintech) would be of benefit to everyone.
The obvious location for this interdisciplinary expertise hub is the OFR.67 The OFR was
created by Dodd-Frank to address the gaps in data availability and analysis that hampered
governmental authorities in their response to the events of 2008.68 It is already authorized to
engage in “performing applied research and essential long-term research” by Section 153(a)(3) of
Dodd-Frank, and the OFR’s Research and Analysis Center is already authorized by Section
65
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154(c)(1)(C) of Dodd-Frank to “maintain expertise in such areas as may be necessary to support
specific requests for advice and assistance from financial regulators.” The OFR’s staffing and
other resources were cut substantially during the Trump Administration,69 but that offers an
opportunity to rebuild the OFR in a new, interdisciplinary way. Because personnel is policy, the
next director of the OFR should be committed to using innovative interdisciplinary approaches to
address emerging financial stability challenges like climate change.
With this interdisciplinary expertise, the OFR could lead the way in developing climaterelated stress test scenarios, as well as new capital risk-weightings that reflect acute climate-related
risks.70 There is also a lack of readily available data about the physical location of assets, and this
data is necessary for assessing physical risks:71 the OFR previously took a leading role in
developing standardized legal entity identifiers (known as LEIs), and it could draw on that
experience to spearhead a project to standardize reporting of asset locations around the world. The
OFR could also work on new types of technology-informed regulatory strategies (often referred to
as “suptech”), including a real-time reporting system for operational outages.
In addition to these types of activities, a rebuilt, interdisciplinary OFR could also provide
direct assistance to other financial regulatory agencies. While OFR employees would not have
primary responsibility for supervising any financial institutions, they could accompany the primary
regulators during some examinations, as well as help review call reports and other relevant
disclosures made to regulators. Interagency collaboration could also take the form of task forces
or joint research projects, where employees of other financial regulatory agencies raise the research
questions, and then partner with the technical experts employed by the OFR to develop and
interrogate solutions. These kinds of interagency collaboration can be established through
Memoranda of Understanding. If the financial regulatory agencies fail to instigate these ventures
themselves, then the FSOC’s Deputies Committee can play a coordinating role. The possibility of
secondments from other agencies to the OFR should also be explored, with the dual aim of bringing
different kinds of regulatory experience (including regulatory problems to be solved) to the OFR,
and training secondees on financial stability issues and new interdisciplinary approaches to them
in a way that they can take back to their home agency.
These are new proposals for an expanded OFR role; the OFR’s core function of data
collection and analysis will also be vital to monitoring climate-related systemic risks. President
Biden’s Executive Order on Climate-Related Financial Risk called for “the sharing of climaterelated financial risk data and information among FSOC member agencies and other executive
departments and agencies (agencies) as appropriate”, and the OFR is the natural candidate to
collect and analyze that data. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done – there are currently a lot
of roadblocks to data sharing. As former OFR economist Greg Feldberg puts it “[l]egacy datacollection technologies, old-school thinking, and bureaucratic turf fights continue to hinder the
authorities’ ability to monitor systemic risks.”72 Standardization of data reporting formats across
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different regulatory agencies as well as across different industries in the private sector will be
needed to monitor climate-related threats, as will innovation in new data collection and analysis
technologies.73 Even with these changes, turf wars may remain an issue – the OFR has had
difficulties in obtaining data from other regulatory agencies in the past,74 and that may continue.
It would therefore be helpful for any reform legislation adopted to include a clear statutory
direction to other financial regulators that they must share data with the OFR.75 Even in the
absence of such a legislative amendment, though, Dodd-Frank already provides indirect
authorization for the OFR to collect data from other agencies: Section 153(a)(1) directs the OFR
to collect data on behalf of the FSOC, and Section 112(a)(1)(A) directs the FSOC to collect data
from other agencies. The FSOC and the OFR working together could therefore compel the
production of data from regulatory agencies (the OFR already has the power under Section 153(f)
of Dodd-Frank to subpoena data from private sector firms).
As currently structured, the OFR is very dependent on a supportive FSOC and Treasury
Secretary. More independence for the OFR is desirable, however: “[i]dentifying financial stability
risks and data gaps means saying things that are unpopular. That mission requires more
independence, not less.”76 A number of steps could be taken to give the OFR more independence,
including removing the OFR from the Treasury Department (which would include transferring
authority for determining the OFR’s funding from the Treasury Department to the OFR itself), and
making the Director of the OFR a voting member of the FSOC (they are currently a non-voting
member). These steps would require legislative changes; if those are not feasible, it is crucial that
the Treasury Secretary and the FSOC support the OFR in its efforts to address climate as a systemic
risk.
8. Summary of action plan
This statement has covered a wide range of proposals designed to make the financial
system more robust to physical and transition risks. Some of these proposals are specific responses
to those physical and transition risks, others are intended to improve our financial regulatory
architecture in general so that it is better equipped to execute financial stability regulation. These
proposals can also be divided into “things that can be done right now”, and longer-term goals. For
ease of reference, I will use these categories to summarize this statement’s proposals here.
Things that can be done right now (without legislative changes)
•

Banking regulators
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•

•

•

o Deploy the countercyclical capital buffer to provide a capital cushion for climaterelated threats
o Disaffirm the “guidance on guidance”
o Require climate-related risk disclosures in the call reports they receive from
regulated banks
o Join the Network for Greening the Financial System
The FSOC
o Hire more staff
o Apply the FSOC designation power to any non-bank financial institutions that are
systemically important and significantly threatened by physical and transition risks
o Apply the FSOC designation power for financial market utilities to designate any
providers of critical infrastructure to the financial industry that have not yet been
designated
o Coordinate a road map of all the climate-related regulatory approaches that are
being (and should be) pursued by each FSOC member agency, together with a
timing and implementation plan for each approach.
The OFR
o Hire more staff, particularly climate scientists, environmental economists, data
scientists, computer scientists, and complexity scientists (offering competitive
salaries where possible)
o Projects should include developing a real-time reporting system for operational
outages; developing consistent physical identifiers for financial assets and
collateral; working on climate scenarios for stress tests and climate-related riskweightings for capital requirements
Investments in infrastructure critical to the provision of financial services (particularly
telecommunications infrastructure)

Longer-term goals
•
•

The next person hired as director of the OFR should be committed to using innovative
interdisciplinary approaches to emerging financial stability challenges like climate change
Pass an omnibus financial reform bill that includes the following:
o A definition of “financial stability”
o Financial stability mandates for each FSOC member agency
o The appointment of an independent chair for the FSOC
o Amendments to Sections 112(b) and 112(a)(2)(N) of Dodd-Frank requiring each
FSOC member agency to certify and testify that their individual agency is taking
steps to promote financial stability by identifying and responding to emerging
climate-related threats
o Amendments to Section 120 of Dodd-Frank allowing the FSOC to make rules, not
just recommendations, regarding systemically risky activities
o Directors of the Office of Financial Research and Federal Insurance Office become
voting members of FSOC
o The OFR becomes an independent agency with authority to establish its own
funding rule
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•
•

o A clear statutory direction to other financial regulators requiring them to share data
with the OFR
Pass legislation requiring businesses to accept cash payments
Coordinate with other members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on:
o Adding an equity buffer to the leverage ratio to provide a cushion against climaterelated uncertainty
o Adopting a more “macro” approach to the supervision of operational risks
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